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Abstract
We show empirically that survey-based measures of expected inflation are
significant and strong predictors of future aggregate stock returns in several
industrialized countries both in-sample and out-of-sample. By empirically dis-
criminating between competing sources of this return predictability by virtue
of a comprehensive set of expectations data, we find that money illusion seems
to be the driving force behind our results. Another popular hypothesis - in-
flation as a proxy for aggregate risk aversion - is not supported by the data.
JEL-Classification: G10, G12, E44
Keywords: Inflation expectations, Money Illusion, Proxy hypothesis, Stock returns
∗The authors want to thank Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through SFB 649 “Eco-
nomic Risk” at Humboldt University (Berlin) and the Centre for European Economic Research
(ZEW, Mannheim) for financial and data suport.
†Maik Schmeling, Department of Economics, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Königsworther
Platz 1, 30167 Hannover, Germany, email: schmeling@gif.uni-hannover.de, phone: +49 511
7628213.
‡Andreas Schrimpf, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) Mannheim, P.O. Box 10
34 43, 68034 Mannheim, Germany, email: schrimpf@zew.de, phone: +49 621 1235160.
1 Introduction
It is empirically well documented that the correlation of inflation and stock returns
is negative or non-existent (Fama and Schwert, 1977; Fama, 1981; Amihud, 1996).
This puzzling piece of evidence stands in sharp contrast to widely accepted economic
principles, such as Fisher Parity, and gives rise to the impression that something
seems “wrong” with inflation and the stock market. However, the stock return-
inflation relationship is of crucial importance, since it quantifies the degree to which
equities are a hedge against inflation risk. Furthermore, central banks aiming at
targeting inflation or controlling inflation expectations have to take into account
spillovers from inflation to asset returns, which again feed back into real economic
activity (see e.g. Barro, 1990; Stock and Watson, 2003).
We contribute to the strand of literature that analyzes the relation of inflation and
stock returns by examining genuine expectation data on inflation for several in-
dustrialized countries. This seems to represent a novel approach for the literature
and produces some fresh insights into the relation of expected inflation and equity
returns which have not been shown before. Our main results are, first, that ex-
pected inflation does indeed strongly and positively forecast stock returns in- and
out-of-sample for several industrialized countries. Second, we discriminate between
competing economic rationales for this predictive power and find that the relation-
ship seems to stem from money illusion (Modigliani and Cohn, 1979; Cohen, Polk,
and Vuolteenaho, 2005) rather than inflation being a proxy for an omitted macro
factor (Fama, 1981) or risk aversion (Brandt and Wang, 2003). Finally, our paper
also contributes towards a better understanding of the role that monetary factors
play for stock markets – a topic which has been largely neglected in earlier papers
(Cochrane, 2007, p.76).
Despite the early evidence on an anomalous relation between inflation and asset
returns, there is good reason to believe that expected inflation should be positively
related to future stock returns, both in nominal and real terms.1 First, under investor
1We stress that our findings relate to expected inflation and stock returns. Therefore, our results
do not corroborate or refute many earlier studies that focus on actual or unexpected inflation.
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rationality, expected inflation is often considered as being positively correlated with
some unobserved macro variable or risk aversion (Fama, 1981; Brandt and Wang,
2003) in such a way that higher inflation expectations are associated with a higher
equity premium and thus, expected stock returns. A second - but behavioral -
channel through which inflation might affect stock returns is money illusion (Fisher,
1928). Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argue that investors discount real stock cash
flows with nominal discount factors, thereby undervaluing equities in times of high
inflation and vice versa. Since this undervaluation will be eliminated once actual
cash flows are revealed, high inflation today will forecast subsequent price increases
and will generate a positive relation between inflation and expected stock returns.
Despite the fact that stakes are high in the stock market so that money illusion
should quickly be arbitraged away, several papers show that even a small amount of
money illusion in the market is sufficient to generate large effects (Fehr and Tyran,
2001; Basak and Yan, 2005). Likewise, the leading practitioner model of equity
valuation, the so-called “Fed model”, falls prey to the “pedestrian mistake” of money
illusion but seems to be widely used by professional investors (Cohen, Polk, and
Vuolteenaho, 2005, p. 641).2 Therefore, money illusion may be expected to be
an important factor in determining the time variation of aggregate stock market
returns.
A crucial ingredient for an analysis of expected inflation and asset returns is the
choice of a proxy for expected inflation.3 We choose a new route to investigate this
seemingly anomalous relation and rely on proxies for near-term expected inflation
derived from a comprehensive survey of professional forecasters covering the U.S.,
U.K., Germany, France, Italy, and Japan, which allows an international investigation
of inflation and asset returns. Up to now, the use of survey data is still relatively
unexplored in the literature and allows us to circumvent joint hypotheses problems
2The Fed model is based on the presumption that stocks and bonds are “competing” assets and
that equity earnings yields follow bond yields in the long run.
3Earlier papers employed different approaches to proxy for expected or unexpected inflation,
including e.g. measures derived from short-term interest rates (Fama and Schwert, 1977) , time-
series methods (e.g. Gultekin, 1983), macro news announcements (Flannery and Protopapadakis,
2002), projections of actual inflation rates on instrumental variables considered to predict inflation
(e.g. Pilotte, 2003), past and current realized inflation rates (Barnes, Boyd, and Smith, 1999) and
survey data on very long-term inflation expectations (Sharpe, 2002).
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induced by imposing models when determining inflation expectations.
By utilizing the richness of the expectation data, we first document that expected
inflation significantly forecasts stock returns in- and out-of-sample, even when con-
trolling for other factors, such as expectations about output movements, lagged div-
idend yields, and lagged term spreads. To the best of our knowledge, this positive
forecasting relation has not been shown before.4 We then move on to discriminate
between competing hypotheses to explain this predictive power. We make use of
subjective investor expectations about future stock returns, output movements, and
inflation movements to investigate whether the rational (proxy hypothesis, risk aver-
sion) or behavioral (money illusion) view is a more likely candidate to explain the
positive correlation between expected inflation and expected stock returns. We find
that subjective expectations about stock returns are negatively affected by infla-
tion expectations – a result that sharply contradicts the risk aversion explanation.
However, as we will argue below, this finding is well in line with money illusion.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section details compet-
ing hypotheses about the relation between inflation and expected stock returns and
describes our approach to make a distinction between these competing hypotheses.
Section 3 details our data and provides descriptive statistics, section 4 discusses the
econometric approach and reports forecasting regression results, section 5 discrimi-
nates between competing hypotheses. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Competing Hypotheses
This section discusses possible explanations for the predictive power of expected
inflation for future stock returns. To get a better grasp of ideas, we use a stan-
dard consumption-based asset pricing framework as the conceptual starting point.
Specifically, the CCAPM with CRRA utility over consumption U(ct) = c
1−γ
t /(1−γ)
implies the basic asset pricing equation
4Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) and Boucher (2006) also investigate forecasts based on
inflation but not for stock returns per se.
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Et[δ(ct+1/ct)
−γRt+1] = 1 (1)
where R denotes a (real) gross return, ct denotes real consumption at time t, δ is
the subjective time discount factor, and γ denotes the risk aversion coefficient (see
e.g. Cochrane, 2005). This is the classic workhorse of cross-sectional macro-finance
asset pricing and it has a simple interpretation. The conditional expectation of the
gross return of any asset, discounted by the stochastic discount factor (which equals
the marginal rate of intertemporal subsitition, Mt+1 = δ(ct+1/ct)
−γ, in our context)
is equal to one. However, this basic relation may also simply be reinterpreted to
yield the time-series implications for asset prices that we are interested in. In order
to do so, it is necessary to perform a covariance decomposition of (1) above, then
take logs (and ignore Jensen’s inequality terms for simplicity), and rearrange the
resulting expression to obtain
Et[rt+1] ≈ φ + γEt[△ct+1] (2)
where r now denotes the asset’s real log return, γ denotes agents’ risk aversion,
and φ is a function of the conditional covariance of log consumption growth △ct+1
and the log return which we assume to be constant. The conditional covariance of
consumption growth and returns is a key ingredient of cross-sectional asset pricing,
but rather uninteresting for our purpose here since we are interested in the time-series
implications of the basic pricing equation. Therefore, we focus our interest on the
remaining two parts of (2). As the approximate relationship in (2) shows, expected
returns are higher when aggregate risk aversion γ is high and when consumption
growth is expected to be high. While there is no room for expected inflation to
directly impact real returns in this framework, the literature has identified ways of
how inflation may have an indirect influence on (2).
In an early contribution, Fama (1981) advanced the so-called “proxy hypothesis”,
which states that inflation proxies for an unobservable or merely unidentified real
macroeconomic variable driving fundamental stock values. Thus, in the context
4
of (2), expected inflation may contain information about future returns, as long
as it proxies for some macro variable driving business conditions and consump-
tion growth.5 A somewhat related explanation, which we will subordinate under the
proxy hypothesis, is that agents are anxious about inflation and that bad news about
inflation induces higher aggregate risk aversion (see e.g. Campbell and Vuolteenaho,
2004). Here, expected inflation proxies for risk aversion, and Shiller (1996) docu-
ments this sort of anxiety on behalf of U.S. consumers. Earlier papers have indeed
incorporated this idea into asset pricing models (see Brandt and Wang (2003) for an
application). Under this framework, higher inflation expectations lead to an increase
in γ in (2), which in turn implies higher expected returns.
Money illusion generally makes identical predictions about the forecasting power of
inflation for asset returns. Most prominently, Modigliani and Cohn (1979) suggest
that agents suffer from money illusion in the sense that they discount real cash flows
with nominal discount rates. Under this hypothesis, an overly strong (weak) nominal
discounting of future real cash flows in times of higher (lower) inflation expectations
depresses (raises) current stock prices and thus leads to an undervaluation (overval-
uation) of equity markets. Again, this result may be illustrated using Equation (2).
If investors suffer from money illusion, they will use a nominal discount rate and the
Equation (2) will now read
Et[rt+1] ≈ φ + γEt[△Ct+1] = φ + γEt[△ct+1 + πt+1] (3)
where C denotes nominal consumption and π denotes inflation.6 Therefore, under
money illusion, higher inflation expectations imply higher stock returns in the fu-
ture. Where does this return predictability stem from? Let us take, for example,
increasing expectations concerning the future path of inflation. A money-illusioned
investor will tend to discount in an overly strong manner, thereby undervaluing
5It should be noted, however, that Fama (1981) constructs a negative relation between inflation
and returns. However, the proxy hypothesis more generally describes an omitted variable problem
that may have different effects on the relation between inflation and stock returns.
6The analogy between consumption growth and the discount factor is most obvious in the
context of the CCAPM.
5
assets in the current period. This undervaluation induced by money illusion will
be eliminated over time when actual cash flows become known and prices return to
(higher) rational levels (see e.g. Brunnermeier and Juillard, 2007). Therefore, higher
inflation expectations imply higher returns in the future.
Both, the hypothesis of inflation as a proxy for some underlying macroeconomic
variable or driver of risk aversion, and the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis predict that
expected inflation should contain information about future returns. This prediction
can easily be verified by estimating forecasting regressions to test for such predictive
power. However, distinguishing between rational (proxy hypothesis, risk aversion)
and behavioral (money illusion) explanations is a difficult task as noted by Campbell
and Vuolteenaho (2004). No econometric analysis will be able to control for all
possible omitted variables that expected inflation might proxy for, which makes it
difficult to separate the two channels. Therefore, Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho
(2005) conclude that earlier tests for the aggregate effects of money illusion cannot
be seen as very compelling. While these authors derive a joint test of money illusion
and the CAPM, which provides valuable insights, we propose a complementary
model-free test that does not assume a particular asset pricing model and thus does
not rely on a joint hypothesis.
Specifically, we examine the relation among subjective expectations concerning out-
put, inflation and stock returns to construct a direct test of a rational versus an
irrational explanation. Under the null of investor rationality and the proxy hypoth-
esis, expected inflation proxies for expected output movements and/or a factor that
drives aggregate risk aversion. Under this specification, subjective return expec-
tations should be driven by subjective expectations about output and, in case of
an omitted variable problem, they should be positively correlated with subjective
inflation expectations. Using such subjective investor expectations on inflation and
returns is a convenient way to circumvent the problem posed by omitted variables.
Since subjective return forecasts already include effects from all variables unobserv-
able by the econometrician, one may test whether expected inflation proxies for such
an omitted variable.
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Conversely, under pure money illusion and no correlation of inflation with aggregate
risk aversion, subjective return expectations must be largely uncorrelated or may
even be negatively correlated with inflation expectations. The latter follows from the
logic that illusion is part of the story. Being illusioned means that investors do not
recognize their error and the resulting misvaluation (i.e. people must be assuming
that adjusting the nominal discount factor to inflation expectations is the end of the
story). For example, higher inflation expectations will lead to a decrease in stock
prices but should have no effect on subjective return expectations since inflation
per se does not change aggregate risk exposure under money illusion. Therefore,
subjective expectations about returns and inflation should not be positively related.
However, if inflation increases or decreases over a prolonged period of time as empiri-
cal evidence strongly suggests (e.g. Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido, 2001), subjective
return expectations may even be negatively correlated with inflation under money
illusion.
Based on these arguments, we test for a rational (proxy hypothesis) versus behav-
ioral (money illusion) explanation for the predictive content of expected inflation
for future returns by directly investigating subjective macroeconomic and return
expectations. Based on a comprehensive set of investor expectations, this approach
exempts us from making additional assumptions on returns or agents’ behavior.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section provides basic descriptive statistics and discusses the usefulness of the
primary data on inflation expectations employed in the empirical analysis below.
For an analysis like ours, the data bottleneck is a proxy for expected inflation. As
described in the preceding sections, researchers have creatively sought for such prox-
ies. However, little evidence is based on genuine investor expectations for relevant
time horizons. We employ six months inflation expectations which are obtained
from a monthly survey of professional forecasters. The survey is conducted by the
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), one of Germany’s largest economic
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research institutes. The survey results usually receive substantial attention from the
financial community, and the data are well-known from earlier academic studies (see
e.g. the discussion in Pesaran and Weale, 2006). Our data covers a time span from
December 1991 (when the survey was started) to September 2007 which yields a
total of 190 monthly observations.
The monthly survey asks about 350 respondents (professional analysts, treasurers,
economists etc. at leading banks, insurance and industrial companies in Germany)
for their opinion about several key macro variables, including CPI inflation for Ger-
many, the U.S., the U.K., France, Italy, and Japan. Answers to this question can
be “up”, “unchanged”, “down”, and “no opinion”. Therefore, we are dealing with
qualitative survey data and our proxy for expected inflation measures whether infla-
tion is expected to increase or decrease (disinflation) and does not measure whether
forecasters expect inflation, no inflation or deflation. Survey measures of inflation
have been widely used in different contexts (e.g. Giordani and Soederlind, 2003)
and have been shown to be very informative for future inflation (Ang, Bekaert, and
Wei, 2007). In the following, we will use the terms inflation expectations, expected
inflation, and inflation sentiment interchangeably.
We aggregate expected inflation answers across forecasters by subtracting the share
of forecasters who vote “down” from the share of forecasters who vote “up”. This
yields an aggregate measure of expected inflation, a so-called balance statistic, which
varies between −1 and 1 by construction.7 Balance statistics for expected inflation
in all six countries are displayed in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Since our data are obtained from German forecasters exclusively, one may worry that
inflation expectations are very similar for different countries because forecasters focus
on Germany and may thus report similar expectations for all countries. As evinced
7Balance statistics are a common way to aggregate qualitative survey data (see e.g. Pesaran
and Weale, 2006). One could use procedures to transform balance statistics into quantitative
expectations. However, we do not pursue this here since quantitative expectations are not necessary
to test for predictive power but require additional, somewhat arbitrary assumptions in order to be
applicable.
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by Figure 1 this is definitely not the case. The graphs show that expected inflation
can vary substantially for different countries at a given point in time. For example,
inflation in Germany and Italy was expected to decrease in the early nineties while
inflation was expected to accelerate in the U.K. and U.S.
Descriptive statistics for inflation expectations are shown in Table 1. Panel A reports
descriptive statistics for aggregate market returns. Returns follow the usual pattern
with low ratios of means to standard deviations, negative skewness and high kurtosis.
Panel B reports mean inflation expectations, which are mostly within a one standard
deviation interval around zero (except for the U.S.), while the maxima and minima
never reach their bounds of plus one and minus one, respectively. Therefore, we
do not observe very extreme expectations. The last row (ρ−1) depicts first-order
autocorrelation coefficients which uniformly lie above 90% in all countries. This
indicates a rather high persistence of inflation expectations which seems natural
since expectations are six months ahead but are reported on a monthly frequency
and thus overlap.
Insert Table 1 about here
An interesting question is also whether the series of inflation sentiment contains a
unit-root or not. We test for this property using augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
and Dickey-Fuller GLS tests. Results reported in Table 2 suggest that inflation
expectations can indeed be considered as stationary. Apart from this statistical
evidence, this result does make sense, since our measure of expected inflation is
bound between minus and plus one due to the construction of the balance statistics,
so that there is a mechanical tendency towards mean reversion in the long run.
Insert Table 2 about here
Finally, we relate our inflation sentiment series to inflation expectations from other
data sources. This is an interesting issue, since our analysis in the next sections
is based on the presumption that German inflation expectations reasonably match
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expected inflation of market participants in the other five countries. To do so, we
first investigate whether our inflation sentiment is correlated with data from the U.S.,
namely data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the University
of Michigan. We employ these series since they are well known in the literature
(see e.g. Ang, Bekaert, and Wei, 2007). Specifically, we employ expected inflation
for the next two quarters from the SPF and Michigan series to match the forecast
horizon of our inflation expectations.8 The correlation of our inflation expectations
with the Michigan expectations is 0.42 (p-value for the null of no correlation: 0.00)
and the correlation with the SPF forecasts is 0.25 (p-value: 0.04). Using other
transformations of the data, e.g. using changes or dummy variables that indicate
rising or decreasing inflation expectations, yield similar results. Therefore, our data
seem to be a reasonable proxy for expectations on U.S. inflation.
Furthermore, we compare our proxies of inflation expectations to similar series de-
rived from Consensus Economics. These data are collected on a monthly basis
by Consensus Economics and refer to forecasts from professional institutions (e.g.
Banks, research institutes etc.) across major countries in the world. The Consensus
data for different forecast horizons depend on the particular date of the forecast.
Forecasts are made for the annual inflation rate at the end of the current year, i.e.
at the end of January, for instance, the forecast horizon is eleven months ahead
while at the end of November the forecast horizon is one month ahead. However,
the forecast horizon is about six months on average so that it may still be useful to
relate these forecasts to our series.9 As with the U.S. data above, we find significant
correlations of our inflation sentiment with the Consensus inflation expectations for
Germany (0.41, p-value 0.00), the U.S. (0.21, p-value 0.00), France (0.18, p-value
0.01), and Japan (0.20, p-value 0.00). However, we find little evidence for the U.K.
where the correlation is 0.09 and insignificant.
All in all, one cannot expect the different proxies for inflation to be perfectly cor-
8We employ quarterly data here, since the U.S. series are not available on a monthly frequency,
and use the last available observation of a given quarter from our monthly series to convert them
into a quarterly series.
9Since the Consensus forecast series for the inflation rate are found to be non-stationary, we
transform the series accordingly by first-differencing.
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related due to different data collection schemes and different forecasting horizons.
Despite these complications, we find our inflation expectations to represent a rea-
sonable proxy for international inflation expectations on average.
However, for our test below, we choose to employ the ZEW survey series instead of
the SPF or Consensus Economics data for two major reasons. First, as noted in the
preceding section, we will need comprehensive data that jointly cover expectations
regarding output, inflation, and stock returns from the same forecasters in order
to discriminate between competing hypotheses that aim at explaining the inflation-
return relation. These data are generally not available from other sources, such as
the SPF or Michigan surveys (at least not for a sufficient time span and for a large
set of forecasters). Second, data sources that offer all three sets of expectations,
such as the Consensus series, are made up by official forecasts of institutions and
companies rather than true expectations of individuals. Hence, in order to study a
phenomenon such as money illusion (which is inherently linked to the behavior and
expectations of individual agents) the ZEW series are more suitable.
Equipped with this confidence of the representativeness of our expectations data,
we will now proceed to test whether our proxies for expected inflation have an
informational content for subsequent aggregate stock returns.
4 The Predictive Power of Expected Inflation for Stock Returns
We run predictive regressions of future returns on expected inflation and other can-
didate state variables to test the main implications of the proxy hypothesis and
money illusion: future real returns should be positively correlated with current ex-
pectations about the future path of inflation. In the following (section 4.1), we will
first describe the type of regressions employed and how we will deal with persistent
regressor biases (Stambaugh, 1999). We will then present our results for in-sample
(section 4.2) and out-of-sample predictability (section 4.3).
4.1. Econometric Methodology
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Our in-sample regressions for a given forecasting horizon k are of the standard form
rt+k = α + βππ
e
t + γ
′zt + ξt+k, (4)
where rt+k = (1/k)
∑k
ℓ=1 rt+ℓ is the average real log return from time t+1 to t+k. We
denote subjective inflation expectations by πe and z is a vector of control variables
known to be related to stock returns (γ is a suitably sized column vector of regression
coefficients). Specifically, for each of the six countries, z includes the dividend yield,
term spread, monthly inflation rate, and the monthly growth of money balances
(M2).10 The dividend yield and the term spread may be seen as the most important
variables, since they are known to have significant predictive power for returns (see
Cochrane, 2005, for a discussion). We also include actual inflation (monthly CPI log
changes) and M2 growth to control for general monetary factors.11 In particular,
our focus lies in the estimate and statistical significance of βπ which measures the
forecasting power of our survey-based measure of inflation expectations for future
returns.
Our main point on predictability will be made by estimating Equation (4) separately
for the six countries in our sample. However, in order to increase the power of our
tests, we will also present results for pooled system estimators of the form:
rt+k = µr + βπΠ
e
t
+ Γvec(Zt) + ηt+k (5)
for different forecast horizons k.12 In these pooled regressions, rt+k is a (n × 1)
vector of average real market returns, i.e. we simultaneously employ n out of the six
countries. Z now is a (h × n) matrix of predetermined control variables as detailed
above, Γ is a matrix of regression coefficients, where the jth row, j = 1, . . . , n, is
given by [01×(j−1)h Γj 01×(n−j)h] with Γj being a 1 × h vector. Furthermore Π
e
10Using e.g. quarterly instead of monthly growth rates for inflation and M2 is not relevant for
the results documented below.
11All additional control variables in z are downloaded from Datastream.
12Ang and Bekaert (2007) also use pooled regressions to increase the power of tests.
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is a (n × 1) vector of expected inflation in a particular country, while βπ is still a
scalar coefficient. Therefore, each country’s market return is regressed on a constant,
its own lagged control variables in Z, and its own lagged expected inflation in Π.
Regression intercepts (µr) and parameters for the control variables (Γ) are allowed to
vary across countries, whereas the coefficient on expected inflation (βπ) is restricted
to being equal across countries.
Finally, in order to render the impact of inflation sentiment more easily interpretable,
we standardize the predictor variable, so that estimated coefficients show the impact
of a one standard deviation rise in expected inflation on future stock returns.
It is well-known (Stambaugh, 1999; Valkanov, 2003) that predictive regressions with
persistent right-hand side variables, as employed here, may suffer from biased esti-
mates due to the correlation of innovations to returns and regressors.13 Thus, regres-
sors are predetermined but not strictly exogenous, which implies that estimates are
consistent but not necessarily unbiased. Simulations and analytical results suggest
that this bias might be substantial in finite samples of the size typically encountered
in empirical studies. Furthermore, using overlapping returns naturally induces a
moving average structure of order k − 1 to the residuals which further complicates
inference. Therefore, we employ a parametric bootstrap to account for this finite-
sample bias and to simulate critical values for our test statistics (see e.g. Kilian,
1999; Mark, 1995; Rapach, Wohar, and Rangvid, 2005, for similar approaches).
Due to these econometric problems, all tables report (a) raw coefficient estimates
and t-statistics based on regressions estimated via OLS with Newey-West standard
errors with a lag length of k−1, and (b) bias-adjusted coefficient estimates and test
statistics obtained by bootstrap methods. The bootstrap is based on estimating
autoregressive models for all time-series of a given regression. Residuals are boot-
strapped and the estimated parameters are used to simulate 10,000 new time-series
13Moreover, typical predictors such as the dividend yield and macro variables such as the output-
price ratio by Rangvid (2006) or the cay variable by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) are calculated
using market prices. Thus, a potential concern is that the empirically documented predictability
may simply result from a temporary “fad” in stock prices being “washed away” (Cochrane, 2007,
p.10). This issue does not arise here, however, since expected inflation does not involve scaling by
market prices.
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under the null of no predictability of length 100 + T , where T is the length of the
sample (190 observations). The first 100 simulated observations of all variables in-
volved are discarded. We then estimate the regression models discussed above on
the 10,000 simulated time-series, which yields a bootstrap distribution of coefficient
estimates and t-statistics. Based on these simulations, we present bias-adjusted co-
efficients, i.e. the unadjusted coefficient estimate minus the average estimate from
the simulations. We also report bootstrap t-statistics, i.e. the bias-adjusted coeffi-
cient divided by the standard deviation of the simulated coefficient estimates, and
a bootstrap p-value, which is based on the share of simulated t-statistics that are
larger (in absolute value) than the absolute value of the raw t-statistic.14
We will draw our inference from the bias-adjusted statistics and bootstrap tests.
However, we also report raw coefficient estimates and t-statistics as noted above.
This is for the sake of completeness and also serves to show that results of our bias-
adjustments are similar to but much more conservative than unadjusted estimates.
4.2. Results for In-sample Predictive Regressions
This section reports results from in-sample predictive regressions of the form shown
in (4). We regress six months average real log returns on lagged expected inflation
and further lagged control variables, as noted above. Panel A of Table 3, shows
the results for the univariate case (expected inflation as the only predictor), whereas
Panel B depicts multivariate forecasting regressions with additional control variables
as noted above.
As can be seen from the bias-adjusted coefficients in Panel A, expected inflation has
a positive coefficient in all countries except Japan and is statistically significant in
Germany, the U.S., Italy, and in France. Also, the results are economically signif-
icant. Averaged across countries, coefficient estimates imply that a one standard
deviation rise in expected inflation raises average monthly returns by about 0.5%
p.m. over the following six months. The effect is most pronounced for France, where
14We have experimented with other bootstrap procedures, e.g. block bootstraps with different
block-selection procedures, and other parametric bootstraps. The results reported in the following
are rather similar when employing these alternative bootstrap methods.
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a one standard deviation increase of inflation sentiment raises expected returns by
about 0.96 × 6 ≈ 6% over the subsequent six months. The economic effect can also
be seen by the rather large adjusted R2’s (R̄2) reported in the Table which displays
values as high as 18% for France. Although R2’s of this size do not seem to be high at
first sight, other predictive variables usually perform much worse for stock markets
(see e.g. Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001). It is also worth looking at the percentage of
adjusted R2s of all bootstrap simulations exceeding the regression R̄2, which we de-
note by %[R̄2b > R̄
2]. These serve as an indicator of possible spuriousness. However,
these “R̄2-p-values” are rather low and only exceed the 10% level for the U.K. and
Japan, which indicates that our results are not driven by persistent regressor effects.
Panel B of Table 3 shows predictive regressions with additional control variables.
Results are similar to those of Panel A, but the impact of expected inflation is even
more pronounced. All countries except Japan show a significant relation between
expected inflation and future returns and these relations are large from an economic
perspective. Again, in order to gauge the significant predictive power of expected
inflation, we report incremental R̄2’s (∆R̄2), i.e. the rise in the adjusted R2 when
additionally including expected inflation in the regressions. Disregarding Japan,
these incremental R2’s are high with the lowest value being 10% and also do not
seem to be spurious since the proportion of simulated incremental R2’s generally
falls below 10%.
Insert Table 3 about here
Therefore, the only country which does not show significant effects of expected
inflation on returns is Japan. This does not seem to be overly surprising since
Japan suffered from a low inflation or even deflation scenario during most of our
sample period. Since our forecasters are asked to predict changes in inflation (and
not levels), the absence of an effect of expected inflation on returns in such a low
inflation environment seems comprehensible. With a Japanese inflation rate of about
0.15% p.a., as in our sample, expected inflation changes should not have dramatic
effects both under the rational account or the money illusion hypothesis in this
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country. The other five countries experienced much higher inflation rates of about
2-3% p.a., so that changes in expected inflation should have much more pronounced
effects than in Japan.
Furthermore, estimates of the pooled model in (5) for three sets of countries are
provided in Table 4. Here, we also present results for different forecasting horizons,
namely k = 1, 3, 6, 9, 12. Panel A shows the results for pooling all countries. The
bias-adjusted coefficient estimate of βπ is strictly positive for all forecast horizons
and significantly different from zero for horizons of three to twelve months. Notably,
the predictive power, as judged by the bootstrap p-values and the magnitude of the
coefficient estimates, does not monotonically increase with the forecasting horizon k
but rather peaks at the six months horizon. This result is comforting, since spurious
results due to persistent regressors and overlapping observations would simply be
increasing in k (see e.g. Hong, Torous, and Valkanov, 2007). Moreover, inflation
expectations show their largest predictive power at the horizon at which the survey
questions are tailored, which is also a reassuring fact. The size of the estimated
coefficient at the six months horizons implies that a one standard deviation shock to
expected inflation leads to a more than 3% increase in real returns over the following
two quarters.
The remainder of Table 4 presents estimates when pooling only the continental
European countries (Germany, France, Italy - Panel B) or only the Anglo-Saxon
countries (U.K., U.S. - Panel C). This grouping is interesting since Germany, France,
and Italy are members of the European Monetary Union and may thus be expected
to have converging inflation dynamics over our sample. This renders these countries
inherently similar for the purpose of our analysis. Furthermore, it is commonly
accepted that the Anglo-Saxon countries are similar in terms of their banking and
financial system structure and that they have a more capital market based culture
(e.g. in terms of pension systems) than the three continental European countries.
Therefore, pooling countries along these dimensions yields somewhat homogenous
groups but still provides more powerful tests compared to the single country analysis
in Table 3.
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Results are similar in the sense that the predictive power of expected inflation shows
up at several horizons and that it tends to reach its peak at the six months horizon.
The main difference in results is the estimated magnitude of the effects which are
stronger for the Continental European countries with a six months effect of almost
5% (6×0.79) versus a six months effect of about 3.5% (6×0.58) for the pooled U.K.
and U.S. sample.15
So far, we can infer that expected inflation carries significant information for fu-
ture stock returns over multiple horizons and that this forecasting power does not
vanish even when we control for other popular forecasting variables such as the div-
idend yield and the term spread. In the following section, we also examine whether
expected inflation is a good predictor for stock returns from an out-of-sample per-
spective as well.
Insert Table 4 about here
4.3. Predictive Power Out-of-Sample
Contrary to conventional wisdom, in-sample tests might be a more reliable and
powerful device to detect predictability than out-of-sample tests (Inoue and Kilian,
2004), since the latter require the full sample to be split up into shorter sub-samples.
Nevertheless, confirmative results from out-of-sample (OOS) tests would be comfort-
ing and we will provide such results in the following.16
15Of course, one may also consider simple predictive regressions without overlapping observa-
tions by throwing away some information. We present such regressions for six-months horizon in
Appendix 1. Here, we only use expected inflation from the months of December and June to fore-
cast subsequent six-months real stock returns and we do not include additional control variables.
We present individual and pooled estimates. Results are very similar and also show high in-sample
R2’s, but since the number of observations (32 observations per country) is low, tests have little
power so that it is hard to control for other predictor variables.
16Recently, there has been a fierce debate in the literature as to the possibility of predicting
stock returns out-of-sample. After an extensive analysis of return predictability for the U.S. stock
market, Goyal and Welch (2006) question the existence of stock return predictability based on
their findings of generally poor OOS performance relative to a näıve benchmark. The papers by
Campbell and Thompson (2007) and Cochrane (2006), however, take a different stance on return
predictability and provide different interpretations of Goyal and Welch’s OOS findings.
17
Our analysis of OOS predictability is based on a recursive design using the first
5 years as initialization period. Afterwards, the forecasting model is estimated
recursively and a T −R−k−1 series of (pseudo-) OOS forecasts is generated, where
T denotes the overall sample size, R = 60 is the initialization period, and k = 6 is
the forecast horizon. The performance of forecasts based on inflation sentiment are
then compared to those of a näıve (unconditional) benchmark model, which is based
on the historical mean of the real stock return known at the date of the forecast
(random walk with drift).
Our evaluation of OOS predictability is based on several different tests. First, we
report the mean forecast error (ME) and its corresponding t-statistic (based on a
HAC-consistent standard error), which can be used to test the unbiasedness of the
forecasts. In addition, Theil’s U is displayed, which is computed as the ratio of the
root-mean-square error (RMSE) of the model-based forecast and the RMSE of the
näıve benchmark model (which is, as usual, a random walk with drift).
In order to test whether the model-based forecasts are superior to the benchmark,
we use the recent test by Clark and West (2007) which is designed to compare
a parsimonious benchmark model with a larger model which nests the benchmark
model.17 The t-statistic (provided below MSPE-adj in Table 5) can be used to assess
whether the difference between the mean square prediction error (MSPE) of the
restricted benchmark model and the adjusted MSPE of the larger model statistically
differs from zero (one-sided test). Again, we use a bootstrap approach (moving
block bootstrap) to obtain the HAC-consistent standard error. As a final statistic
we report the out-of-sample R2 following the paper by Campbell and Thompson
(2007).18
17The central idea of the test by Clark and West (2007) is to adjust the mean squared forecast
error of the larger unrestricted model for upward bias. The reason is that – under the null hypothesis
(additional regressors in the larger model are not necessary for forecasting) – the unrestricted model
needs to estimate parameters that are zero in population, which introduces noise in the forecast.
18The out-of-sample R2 is computed as









where r̂t+k denotes the return forecast using information on expected inflation as of t and r̄t+k
denotes the historical mean return, also computed using data up to t.
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Insert Table 5 about here
Table 5 provides OOS forecast evaluation results. The forecasts generally appear to
be unbiased and produce lower root-mean-square prediction errors than the näıve
benchmark model (Theil’s U is smaller than one), which is quite remarkable given the
fact that stock returns are notoriously difficult to predict (see Rapach, Wohar, and
Rangvid (2005) for a discussion of return predictability with macro variables). The
only exception is Japan, consistent with the in-sample estimation results. In three
cases (Germany, Italy, France), we find statistical evidence for a superior predictive
ability compared to the benchmark model. For these countries, the Clark-West
statistic in Table 5 is significant at less than the 10% level. The results on the
out-of-sample R2 for Germany, U.K., U.S., and Italy (ranging from 0.02 to 0.07) are
quite high for a semi-annual horizon, which is (quantitatively) in line with recent
results reported by Cooper and Priestley (2006). The OOS R2 of 10% in the case
of France points towards a high degree of out-of-sample return predictability by
inflation expectations in this country.
Insert Figure 2 about here
We also investigate the time-variation of OOS performance using Net-SSE plots as in
Goyal and Welch (2006), which are a simple but rather informative diagnostic device
for comparing the relative OOS performance of competing models over time.19 These
diagnostic graphs are provided in Figure 2. The Net-SSE plots broadly corroborate
the results for Theil’s U in Table 5: With the exception of Japan, Net-SSE remains
positive at the end of the sample. They also point towards a particularly good OOS
performance of models based on inflation sentiment in particular since mid-2001
(especially in the case of Italy and France).
19Goyal and Welch suggest to plot the cumulative sum of squared forecast errors of the benchmark
model minus the squared errors of the conditional model. When the graph exceeds the zero
horizontal line, it indicates that the model of interest outperforms the benchmark model in terms
of squared forecast errors up to this particular point in time.
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5 Discriminating between Competing Explanations
We have demonstrated that expected inflation is a strong predictor of stock returns.
The empirical approach in this section now seeks to discriminate between the com-
peting hypotheses discussed in section 2. To this end, we perform the following
steps. First, we show that the forecasting power of expected inflation is not elim-
inated when controlling for expected output movements. In the spirit of the pure
proxy hypothesis (Fama, 1981), one could argue that inflation expectations proxy
for expected real output movements. We show that controlling for such output
expectations does not change our main result. Second, we have to discriminate be-
tween expected inflation as a proxy for expected aggregate risk aversion and money
illusion, which constitutes a challenging task (Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004).
However, the risk aversion account makes a clear prediction: If there is a link between
inflation and risk aversion, higher subjective inflation expectations should also be
associated with higher subjective stock return expectations. This follows from the
mechanics of rational expectations which have to be consistent with the underlying
economic mechanism. Under money illusion, higher subjective inflation expectations
should not be positively correlated with higher subjective stock return expectations
since investors are illusioned by the implications of inflation. Rather, as we have
argued in section 2, one would expect to observe no or even a negative correlation
under this form of investor irrationality. We test these different predictions with
a comprehensive set of expectations data, which avoids imposing models and joint
hypotheses problems as noted in the introduction.
Consider the pure proxy hypothesis first. If inflation expectations were to proxy for
output movements, the predictive power of expected inflation should be erased once
we control for output expectations in the predictive regressions. Since our data set
also contains subjective expectations about future output movements, we employ
a balance statistic similar to the one employed for inflation expectations to proxy
for expected output growth.20 We then regress future stock returns on expected
20We subtract the share of forecasters who vote“economic slowdown”from the share of forecasters
who vote“economic performance increases”. Some descriptive statistics for this economic sentiment
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inflation πe, expected output movements ye, and further control variables as before
(dividend yields etc.). Results of these regressions are shown in Table 6 which reports
bias-adjusted coefficient estimates for a horizon of six months for expected inflation
(βπ) and expected output growth (βy). Furthermore, incremental adjusted R
2s for
expected inflation (denoted △R̄2(π)) are also depicted.
Insert Table 6 about here
The table shows that expected inflation is informative for future returns even after
controlling for expected output. In fact, we observe a significant forecasting power
of expected inflation for all countries except Japan, but there is little evidence for
predictive power of expected output. Although expected business conditions have a
negative sign as in Campbell and Diebold (2005), the only significant coefficient is
obtained for France. Therefore, expected inflation as a proxy for expected business
conditions is a very unlikely explanation for the inflation-return relation uncovered
in this paper.
As noted above, the second step consists of checking whether the positive inflation-
return relation can be reconciled with a rational explanation in which inflation ex-
pectations proxy for (time-varying) risk aversion. To do this, we employ subjective
stock return expectations se obtained from the same data source. Descriptive statis-
tics for these return expectations which we also transform into a balance statistic
can be found in Appendix 3. As can be gathered from this Appendix, one cannot
reject the null of non-stationarity for some of the series.
For our analysis we run vector autoregressions of the form






















′ is a vector of differenced subjective expectations, Ξt
variable can be found in Appendix 2.
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a vector of structural shocks. The identification scheme shown above is identical
to a Cholesky factorization with variable ordering △ye,△πe,△se. This ordering
seems natural from a macro perspective since it assumes that real output movements
drive inflation and that stock returns are driven by macroeconomic conditions. We
are mainly interested in estimating ϕπ,s which shows the direct, contemporaneous
impulse-response of expected stock returns se to innovations in expected inflation
πe. However, we also include expected output movements ye to control for real
macroeconomic conditions.21
We employ first differences of subjective expectations since stock return expectations
show signs of non-stationarity. Therefore, for the following analysis we rely on
cumulative impulse-responses which again allow us to trace the effects on levels.22
Starting with the direct effects ϕi,j in the upper part of Table 7, we observe that
the effect of expected output shocks to expected stock returns ϕy,s is significant and
positive in all six countries. This effect is well in line with standard theory which is
illustrated by equation (2) in section 2. However, the direct effect of expected infla-
tion on stock returns ϕπ,s is not consistent with a rational expectations framework.
The effect of innovations to expected inflation on expected stock returns is strictly
negative for all six countries but comparatively weak, since results are largely in-
significant. Given the strong and positive relation of expected inflation with actual
future returns, investors do not seem to be aware of the predictive power of inflation
expectations for future returns. However, this negative and statistically weak rela-
tion is exactly what one would expect for money-illusioned investors who are not
aware of their mistake under the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis.23
Insert Table 7 about here
21The results reported in the following are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of ye and to
different identification schemes, e.g. ordering πe first or ordering se first. More generally, se and
πe are negatively correlated in all countries.
22Using levels or changes in the VAR has no qualitative effect on the results. However, given
the mild evidence on non-stationarity for our stock return expectations, using changes seems to be
more conservative.
23Table 7 also contains some diagnostic tests, namely the adj. Portmanteau statistic for residual
autocorrelation and a test for (vector) GARCH effects. Results of these tests indicate that residuals
do not suffer from autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity.
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Likewise, we also present results for six-months cumulative impulse-responses which
we denote as Θi,j, such that Θπ,s, for instance, represents the cumulative response
of subjective return expectations to expected inflation shocks. Results do not dif-
fer much. Incompatible with a rational account, subjective return expectations do
not rise significantly after shocks to expected inflation and, again, the majority of
impulse-responses is negative. However, expected output is a significant and pos-
itive driver of expected inflation which makes sense from a New Keynesian point
of view and indicates that the behavior of forecasters in our sample is not unusual
for other macroeconomic variables. Table 7 also shows six-months variance decom-
positions of subjective stock return expectations, where e.g. V D
(6)
π→s denotes the
share of variance over a six months forecast horizon due to shocks to expected infla-
tion. Consistent with our findings above, expected inflation has little to say about
expected stock returns.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that a survey-based measure of expected inflation carries significant
forecasting power for future stock returns in several major equity markets. This pre-
dictive power shows up in our in- and out-of-sample tests and is most pronounced
over intermediate horizons of six months. Although earlier studies predominantly
failed to find a positive relation between expected inflation and stock returns, which
may be due to different measuring approaches, this positive relation is not unex-
pected. Variants of the proxy hypothesis as well as of the money illusion hypothesis
make exactly the same predictions about the relation of expected inflation and re-
turns as those which have been uncovered in this paper.
Therefore, discriminating between competing hypotheses seems to be an interesting
task. We do this by using model-free tests based on relations of subjective investor
expectations about future output growth, inflation, and stock returns. Our findings
suggest that expected inflation neither proxies for future output movements nor for
higher risk aversion under a rational account, since subjective expectations are not
consistent with these explanations. Rather, our results favor money illusion as the
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main driver of the predictive power of inflation for stock returns.
Going beyond the results documented in this paper, our findings also have more gen-
eral implications for asset pricing and macroeconomics. First, since we are employing
a sample of several countries, our results suggest that money illusion is not limited
to the U.S. which was the prime focus of most of the earlier papers (e.g. Campbell
and Vuolteenaho, 2004; Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho, 2005). Second, the effects
of money illusion seem to be quite influential. Our point estimates imply that a
one standard deviation rise of expected inflation depresses stock returns by more
than six percent over the following six months. The strength of this effect may be
policy-relevant since it interferes with standard monetary policy transmission chan-
nels. For example, the Tobin’s Q channel of monetary transmission suggests that
central banks can raise output by lowering interest rates, which leads to higher stock
valuations and thus raises investment activity (see Tobin, 1968; Barro, 1990; Stock
and Watson, 2003, for the mechanism, and the predictive power of asset prices for
future output, respectively). If this expansive stance of monetary policy also raises
inflation expectations, our results suggest that money illusion may weaken or even
outweigh Tobin’s Q effect as higher inflation sentiment depresses stock prices, raises
future capital costs, and thus weakens incentives to invest. However, we leave an
analysis of the macroeconomic implications of money illusion to future research.
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of expected inflation for the six countries in
our sample. The sample range is December 1991 to August 2007.
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Figure 2: Net-SSE Plots
(a) Germany (b) United Kingdom
(c) United States (d) France
(e) Italy (f) Japan
Notes: The figure shows Net-SSE plots for the aggregate stock market follow-
ing Goyal and Welch (2006). Net-SSE is the cumulated difference of squared







c,t), where euc,t is the forecast error of the unconditional
benchmark, and ec,t is the error of the conditional model. A decrease of the slope
represents a better forecast performance of the unconditional model at the particular
point in time.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Aggregate Stock Market Returns
GER U.K. U.S. FR IT JP
Mean 0.83 0.86 0.88 1.00 0.91 0.10
SD 5.38 4.05 3.83 5.29 6.26 5.20
Skew -0.86 -0.75 -0.51 -0.52 0.15 0.17
Kurt 4.66 4.53 3.93 3.72 3.78 3.30
Max 15.00 11.62 12.45 15.26 21.14 16.46
Min -20.22 -14.31 -11.68 -16.34 -17.83 -13.58
Panel B: Expected Inflation
GER U.K. U.S. FR IT JP
Mean 0.02 0.21 0.31 0.09 0.10 0.24
SD 0.41 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.22
Skew -0.53 -0.15 -0.65 -0.22 -0.22 0.51
Kurt 2.35 2.45 2.82 3.43 3.12 2.06
Max 0.83 0.72 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.77
Min -0.87 -0.43 -0.48 -0.68 -0.66 -0.12
ρ−1 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.97
Notes: The table depicts descriptive statistics for aggregate stock market returns
(Panel A) and expected inflation (Panel B). SD denotes standard deviation. In
Panel A, ρ−1 denotes the first order autocorrelation coefficient.
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Table 2. Unit Root Tests
GER U.K. U.S. FR IT JP
ADF -2.88 -3.01 -3.13 -2.88 -3.02 -3.21
**(0.05) **(0.04) **(0.03) **(0.05) **(0.03) **(0.02)
DF-GLS -2.46 -1.37 -2.11 -2.59 -3.03 -1.79
**(<0.05) (>0.10) **(<0.05) ***(<0.01) ***(<0.01) *(<0.10)
Notes: The table reports results from Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Dickey-
Fuller GLS (DF-GLS) unit root tests. Numbers in parentheses are p-values and
stars refer to the level of significance: *: α ≤ 0.10, **: α ≤ 0.05, and ***: α ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3. Expected Inflation and Expected Aggregate Stock Returns
Panel A: Predictive regressions of rt+6 on π
e
t
GER U.K. U.S. FR IT JP
βπ 0.65 0.36 0.58 0.96 0.75 -0.09
BS t-stat [1.66] [1.35] [2.12] [2.61] [1.75] [-0.21]
BS p-val *(0.09) (0.20) **(0.04) **(0.02) *(0.09) (0.73)
R̄2 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.00
%[R̄2b > R̄
2] 0.09 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.78
coef (unadj.) 0.69 0.40 0.62 0.98 0.74 -0.13
t-stat (unadj.) 3.92 3.06 5.38 6.30 4.00 -0.69
Panel B: Predictive regressions of rt+6 on π
e
t , zt
GER U.K. U.S. FR IT JP
βπ 0.91 0.60 0.60 1.13 0.84 -0.29
BS t-stat [2.15] [1.90] [1.98] [2.78] [1.78] [-0.67]
BS p-val **(0.04) **(0.03) **(0.02) ***(0.01) **(0.05) (0.50)
R̄2 0.19 0.28 0.26 0.30 0.17 0.30
△R̄2 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.22 0.10 0.01
%[△R̄2b > △R̄
2] 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.91
coef (unadj.) 0.93 0.64 0.64 1.15 0.87 -0.31
t-stat (unadj.) 3.26 3.11 3.70 3.97 3.04 -1.06
Notes: The first three rows report bias-adjusted coefficient estimates of βπ, boot-
strap t-statistics, and bootstrap p-values, respectively. R̄2 and %[R̄2b > R̄
2] show
adjusted R2s and the share of adj. R2s across simulations that exceed the ordinary
R̄2. △R̄2 denotes incremental R̄2s, i.e. the rise in the R̄2 when additionally includ-
ing inflation sentiment as a regressor. Rows ”coef (unadj.)” and ”t-stat (unadj.)”
show simple OLS coefficient estimates and t-statistics based on Newey-West HAC
standard errors. Stars refer to the level of significance: *: α ≤ 0.10, **: α ≤ 0.05,
and ***: α ≤ 0.01.
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Table 4. System Estimation Results
Panel A: All countries
Forecast horizon (months)
k=1 k=3 k=6 k=9 k=12
βπ 0.32 0.33 0.55 0.31 0.27
BS t-stat [1.10] [1.72] [2.56] [1.49] [1.31]
BS p-val (0.13) *(0.08) ***(0.00) *(0.06) *(0.07)
βπ (unadj.) 0.30 0.40 0.58 0.48 0.45
t-stat (unadj.) [1.19] [1.62] [3.51] [2.37] [2.44]
Panel B: GER, FR, IT
Forecast horizon (months)
k=1 k=3 k=6 k=9 k=12
βπ 0.57 0.80 0.79 0.54 0.29
BS t-stat [1.68] [2.48] [2.62] [1.74] [0.93]
BS p-val *(0.07) **(0.04) ***(0.00) *(0.07) (0.20)
βπ (unadj.) 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.85 0.65
t-stat (unadj.) [2.72] [2.20] [4.00] [2.45] [2.06]
Panel C: U.K., U.S.
Forecast horizon (months)
k=1 k=3 k=6 k=9 k=12
βπ 0.54 0.43 0.58 0.43 0.37
BS t-stat [1.86] [2.00] [2.47] [2.00] [1.70]
BS p-val **(0.05) **(0.04) **(0.01) **(0.02) *(0.06)
βπ (unadj.) 0.52 0.51 0.64 0.61 0.58
t-stat (unadj.) [2.16] [1.91] [3.92] [2.39] [2.29]
Notes: This table shows system estimation results, where countries are pooled and
the coefficient on inflation sentiment is restricted to being the same across countries.
The three panels show results for different sets of countries. Stars refer to the level
of significance: *: α ≤ 0.10, **: α ≤ 0.05, and ***: α ≤ 0.01.
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Table 5. Out-of-sample Predictive Power
GER U.K. U.S. FR IT JP
ME -0.636 -0.352 -0.235 -0.364 -0.039 0.443
t-stat (-1.043) (-0.816) (-0.556) (-0.707) (-0.067) (0.663)
Theil’s U 0.985 0.993 0.981 0.940 0.963 1.019
MSPE-adj 0.783 0.128 0.986 3.348 0.965 -0.054
t-stat (CW) *(1.421) 0.572 0.924 ***(2.234) *(1.551) -0.196
R2OOS 0.030 0.013 0.037 0.116 0.073 -0.038
Notes: The table displays forecast evaluation statistics (forecast horizon of six
months). ME denotes the mean prediction error and the t-statistic for testing un-
biasedness is provided below. Theil’s U is the ratio of the RMSE of the conditional
model and the RMSE of the benchmark model. MSPE-adj is the difference of the
MSPE of the benchmark model and the adjusted MSPE of the conditional model
as in Clark and West (2007); the corresponding t-statistic is reported below. R2OOS
denotes the out-of-sample R2 as in Campbell and Thompson (2007). *: α ≤ 0.10,
**: α ≤ 0.05, and ***: α ≤ 0.01 refer to the level of significance in the Clark-West
test.
Table 6. Controlling for Economic Sentiment
GER U.K. U.S. FR IT JP
βπ 0.88 0.48 0.62 1.30 0.85 -0.66
BS p-val **(0.05) **(0.05) **(0.03) ***(0.01) **(0.05) (0.19)
βy -0.07 -0.51 -0.79 -0.80 0.05 1.15
BS p-val (0.82) (0.12) (0.11) **(0.04) (0.98) (0.10)
R̄2 0.18 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.15 0.35
△R̄2(π) 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.27 0.10 0.04
Notes: βπ denotes the predictive coefficient of expected inflation, whereas βy denotes
the same statistic for expected output. △R̄2(π) is the incremental adjusted R2 when
including expected inflation as an additional predictor. Stars refer to the level of
significance: *: α ≤ 0.10, **: α ≤ 0.05, and ***: α ≤ 0.01.
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Table 7. VAR Analysis
GER U.K. U.S. FR IT JP
ϕy,π -0.005 0.007 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.024
(0.007) (0.005) **(0.005) *(0.006) (0.006) ***(0.003)
ϕy,s 0.010 0.026 0.023 0.015 0.020 0.053
*(0.006) ***(0.005) ***(0.006) ***(0.005) ***(0.006) ***(0.006)
ϕπ,s -0.010 -0.012 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008 -0.001
*(0.006) **(0.005) *(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Θ
(6)
y,π 0.033 0.046 0.050 0.060 0.050 0.064
(0.025) ***(0.013) ***(0.014) ***(0.017) ***(0.018) ***(0.012)
Θ
(6)
y,s 0.001 0.015 0.028 0.004 0.009 0.071
(0.013) (0.01) **(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) ***(0.013)
Θ
(6)
π,s -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 0.004 -0.007 0.013
(-0.012) *(0.09) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
V D
(6)
y→s 1.81 12.74 7.52 5.42 7.30 38.30
V D
(6)
π→s 1.89 2.87 4.54 2.43 0.99 1.30
adj. Q10 43.88 95.41 82.17 96.75 97.44 86.35
(0.17) (0.13) (0.19) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
VARCH5 165.95 169.20 172.88 164.90 166.42 167.28
(0.79) (0.71) (0.64) (0.78) (0.76) (0.74)
Lags 1 1 2 1 1 2
Notes: ϕi,j denotes the contemporaneous impact of a shock in variable i on variable
j, whereas Θ
(6)
i,j denotes the six-months cumulative impulse-response of j to shocks
in i. V D(6)(i → j) shows variance decomposition results for a six-months horizon.
Numbers in parentheses below ϕ, Θ are standard errors. Row adj. Q10 shows the
adjusted Portmanteau statistic for serial autocorrelation up to the tenth order and
the Lagrange multiplier test statistic for vector ARCH effects with 5 lags is shown
in row VARCH5. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. The lag length of the VAR
(Lags) is shown in the last row. Stars refer to the level of significance: *: α ≤ 0.10,
**: α ≤ 0.05, and ***: α ≤ 0.01.
36
Appendix 1. Simple, Semiannual Predictive Regressions
GER U.K. U.S. FR IT JP All
const 5.09 3.75 1.49 4.86 5.05 4.98 5.07
[1.90] [1.35] [0.45] [2.10] [1.87] [1.30] [10.44]
πe 8.88 7.83 12.55 17.54 13.21 -13.24 9.82
**[2.16] [1.23] *[1.87] **[2.58] **[2.56] [-1.62] ***[2.62]
R2 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.15 0.12 -0.00
Notes: This table presents predictive regressions for all six countries individually
and for pooling all countries (column ”All”). The sampling frequency is six months.
Appendix 2. Descriptive Statistics for Economic Sentiment
GER U.K. U.S. FR IT JP
Mean 0.32 0.06 0.07 0.32 0.25 0.32
SD 0.37 0.24 0.37 0.27 0.27 0.26
Max 0.90 0.61 0.85 0.80 0.80 0.80
Min -0.62 -0.55 -0.71 -0.18 -0.34 -0.33
ρ−1 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.93
ADF -4.02 -3.03 -2.58 -3.76 -3.36 -3.05
***(0.00) **(0.03) *(0.09) ***(0.00) **(0.01) **(0.03)
DF-GLS -1.74 -2.12 -1.79 -2.67 -2.15 -1.42
*(<0.10) **(<0.05) *(<0.10) ***(<0.01) **(<0.05) (>0.10)
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for economic sentiment. SD denotes
standard deviation, ρ−1 denotes first-order autocorrelations, ADF denotes Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test, and DF-GLS denotes Dickey-Fuller GLS tests.
Appendix 3. Descriptive Statistics for Expected Stock Returns
GER U.K. U.S. FR IT JP
Mean 0.51 0.17 0.26 0.50 0.41 0.43
SD 0.13 0.28 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.19
Max 0.82 0.63 0.65 0.75 0.73 0.75
Min 0.13 -0.52 -0.09 0.14 -0.14 -0.08
ρ−1 0.80 0.93 0.95 0.81 0.88 0.89
ADF -4.55 -2.73 -2.42 -4.41 -3.60 -3.53
***(0.00) *(0.07) (0.13) ***(0.00) ***(0.01) ***(0.01)
DF-GLS -2.48 -1.44 -1.21 -1.88 1.51 -1.51
**(<0.05) (>0.10) (>0.10) *(<0.10) (>0.10) (>0.10)
Notes: This table depicts descriptive statistics for subjective return expectations. SD
denotes standard deviation, ρ−1 denotes first-order autocorrelations, ADF denotes




SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2008 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 
please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de. 
 
001 "Testing Monotonicity of Pricing Kernels" by Yuri Golubev, Wolfgang 
Härdle and Roman Timonfeev, January 2008. 
002 "Adaptive pointwise estimation in time-inhomogeneous time-series 
 models" by Pavel Cizek, Wolfgang Härdle and Vladimir Spokoiny, 
 January 2008. 
003 "The Bayesian Additive Classification Tree Applied to Credit Risk 
 Modelling" by Junni L. Zhang and Wolfgang Härdle, January 2008. 
004 "Independent Component Analysis Via Copula Techniques" by Ray-Bing 
 Chen, Meihui Guo, Wolfgang Härdle and Shih-Feng  Huang, January 
 2008. 
005   "The Default Risk of Firms Examined with Smooth Support Vector 
 Machines" by Wolfgang Härdle, Yuh-Jye Lee, Dorothea Schäfer 
 and Yi-Ren Yeh, January 2008. 
006 "Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall when there is long range 
 dependence" by Wolfgang Härdle and Julius Mungo, Januray 2008. 
007  "A Consistent Nonparametric Test for Causality in Quantile" by 
 Kiho Jeong and Wolfgang Härdle, January 2008. 
008 "Do Legal Standards Affect Ethical Concerns of Consumers?" by Dirk 
 Engelmann and Dorothea Kübler, January 2008. 
009   "Recursive Portfolio Selection with Decision Trees" by Anton Andriyashin, 
 Wolfgang Härdle and Roman Timofeev, January 2008. 
010 "Do Public Banks have a Competitive Advantage?" by Astrid Matthey, 
 January 2008. 
011 "Don’t aim too high: the potential costs of high aspirations" by Astrid 
 Matthey and Nadja Dwenger, January 2008. 
012   "Visualizing exploratory factor analysis models" by Sigbert Klinke and 
 Cornelia Wagner, January 2008. 
013 "House Prices and Replacement Cost: A Micro-Level Analysis" by Rainer 
 Schulz and Axel Werwatz, January 2008. 
014 "Support Vector Regression Based GARCH Model with Application to 
 Forecasting Volatility of Financial Returns" by Shiyi Chen, Kiho Jeong and 
 Wolfgang Härdle, January 2008. 
015  "Structural Constant Conditional Correlation" by Enzo Weber, January 
 2008. 
016 "Estimating Investment Equations in Imperfect Capital Markets" by Silke 
 Hüttel, Oliver Mußhoff, Martin Odening and Nataliya Zinych, January 
 2008. 
017   "Adaptive Forecasting of the EURIBOR Swap Term Structure" by Oliver 
 Blaskowitz and Helmut Herwatz, January 2008. 
018 "Solving, Estimating and Selecting Nonlinear Dynamic Models without 
 the Curse of Dimensionality" by Viktor Winschel and Markus Krätzig, 
 February 2008. 
019 "The Accuracy of Long-term Real Estate Valuations" by Rainer Schulz, 
 Markus Staiber, Martin Wersing and Axel Werwatz, February 2008. 
020  "The Impact of International Outsourcing on Labour Market Dynamics in 
 Germany" by Ronald Bachmann and Sebastian Braun, February 2008. 
021  "Preferences for Collective versus Individualised Wage Setting" by Tito 
 Boeri and Michael C. Burda, February 2008. 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
022 "Lumpy Labor Adjustment as a Propagation Mechanism of Business 
 Cycles" by Fang Yao, February 2008. 
023 "Family Management, Family Ownership and Downsizing: Evidence from 
 S&P 500 Firms" by Jörn Hendrich Block, February 2008. 
024 "Skill Specific Unemployment with Imperfect Substitution of Skills" by 
 Runli Xie, March 2008.  
025 "Price Adjustment to News with Uncertain Precision" by Nikolaus 
 Hautsch, Dieter Hess and Christoph Müller, March 2008.  
026  "Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game" by Dietmar 
 Fehr, Dorothea Kübler and David Danz, March 2008. 
027 "The Stochastic Fluctuation of the Quantile Regression Curve" by 
 Wolfgang Härdle and Song Song, March 2008. 
028  "Are stewardship and valuation usefulness compatible or alternative 
 objectives of financial accounting?" by Joachim Gassen, March 2008. 
029 "Genetic Codes of Mergers, Post Merger Technology Evolution and Why 
 Mergers Fail" by Alexander Cuntz, April 2008. 
030  "Using R, LaTeX and Wiki for an Arabic e-learning platform" by Taleb 
 Ahmad, Wolfgang Härdle, Sigbert Klinke and Shafeeqah Al Awadhi, April
 2008. 
031 "Beyond the business cycle – factors driving aggregate mortality rates" 
 by Katja Hanewald, April 2008. 
032 "Against All Odds? National Sentiment and Wagering on European 
 Football" by Sebastian Braun and Michael Kvasnicka, April 2008. 
033 "Are CEOs in Family Firms Paid Like Bureaucrats? Evidence from 
 Bayesian and Frequentist Analyses" by Jörn Hendrich Block, April 2008. 
034 "JBendge: An Object-Oriented System for Solving, Estimating and 
 Selecting Nonlinear Dynamic Models" by Viktor Winschel and Markus 
 Krätzig, April 2008. 
035 "Stock Picking via Nonsymmetrically Pruned Binary Decision Trees" by 
 Anton Andriyashin, May 2008. 
036 "Expected Inflation, Expected Stock Returns, and Money Illusion: What 
 can we learn from Survey Expectations?" by Maik Schmeling and 
 Andreas Schrimpf, May 2008. 
